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December 7, 1941—The Day the Honolulu Fire Department
Went to War1
John E. Bowen
The telephone from the Honolulu Fire Department's (HFD) alarm bureau
rang in the quarters of Engine Company 6* in Kalihi at 0805 on Sunday,
December 7, 1941, just as it had so many times before in this busy station.
Lieutenant Frederick Kealoha answered and sounded the house gong. Despite
the apparent normality of this routine, this was not just another alarm—Engine
6 was going to war. One firefighter would never return; others would be
seriously wounded. The Japanese had unleashed their infamous attack ten
minutes earlier upon Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field and other military bases
on Oahu.2
Richard L. Young, then a rookie of eight months who was later to serve for
three years as HFD chief, describe his company's summons to battle: "My shift
had just reported to work at 0800. While standing in the back of the engine
house, Lt. Kealoha and the five of us on duty that morning noticed anti-
aircraft guns in action over Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field. And, of course,
we had been following the situation in Washington and the international
tension that had built up but we had never seen that type of activity before.
So much concentrated anti-aircraft artillery going at one time and we suspected
that something had happened at Pearl. We were just standing by for the signal
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* A "company" ,in fire department terminology, is defined as a single specialized operational
unit, consisting of one or two pieces of apparatus and the personnel who man this (these)
vehicle(s). A company is designated according to its function: e.g., engine company (to
supply water) ; ladder company (ventilation and salvage) ; rescue company, etc. The term
"company" is often deleted in everyday usage so Engine Company 6 and Ladder Company
7, for example, will be referred to as simply Engine 6 and Ladder 7. All of Honolulu's engine
companies in 1941 were "two piece companies"', composed of a pumper (or engine) and a
hosewagon (or simply wagon). Thus, Engine Company 6 consisted of Pumper 6 and Hose-
wagon 6. A single vehicle serves the purposes of both pumper and wagon today.
Also, a company is quartered in a station bearing the same number. Engine 1 responds
from Station 1; Engine 7 and Ladder 7 both are quartered in Station 7.
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to respond." And that signal came very soon for Engine 6, the first-due
Honolulu company at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field under a mutual aid
pact with the military fire departments.
Young continued, "We (HFD) assisted the military departments in any of
their emergencies because of the mutual aid pact. At that time it was a simple
instrument but it has since been elaborated upon. Whenever the military
needed help, the City would send whatever help they had available within the
perimeter of the military establishment, and vice versa for the military."
Military training exercises were routine on Oahu in late 1941 because of
the world political situation. The anti-aircraft training ammunition generated
small puffs of white smoke in the sky, a common sight in those days. But,
suddenly, the frightening reality dawned upon Honolulu's firefighters on that
bright Sabbath morning: the rounds that they were watching produced black
smoke—the shells being fired were not training rounds. It was live ammunition.
Oahu was being attacked.
Young continued, saying that "The alarm telephone did ring and we knew
in which direction we were headed." Engines 4 and 6 were initially dispatched
to Hickam Field.
An off-duty Honolulu firefighter, Anthony Lopez, was enroute to church
that morning. Suddenly he saw a low-flying plane with the rising sun insignia
on the wings. Training exercises were so commonplace over Honolulu, though,
that Lopez (now deputy chief of the HFD) assumed the planes to be part of
another practice exercise, albeit a very realistic one. Explosions soon began
to shake the church from time to time, but these too were attributed to the
realism of the training drills. Lopez said that, "Twenty or thirty minutes later
I heard sirens as the fire apparatus passed the church. Shortly afterward, more
engines came by so I knew that a second alarm had been sounded. When I
went outside I saw a huge column of black smoke from the vicinity of Pearl
Harbor. The possibility of an enemy attack didn't enter my mind. Instead,
I figured that a fuel storage tank at Pearl had ignited."
Knowing that a large fire would mean his recall to duty, Lopez sprinted to
his car, turned the radio on, and headed home to get his turnout gear.* On
the way, a disc jockey announced that Oahu had been attacked by an enemy
country. "Only then did I remember the plane with the red balls on the wings,
and make the connection between it and the explosions at Pearl Harbor",
Lopez added.
It was about a 12-minute response for Engine 6 to Hickam Field so Young,
Harry Tuck Lee Pang and Bill Tam, riding the wagon's rear step, had plenty
of time to contemplate what they were getting into. Young continued: "As we
responded over winding Moanalua Road and Puuloa Road, we saw towering
columns of black smoke with flames leaping hundreds of feet into the sky. The
anti-aircraft firing had diminished considerably, causing us to speculate that
* A firefighter's turnout, or running, gear consists of helmet, rubber boots and rubber-lined
canvas coat.
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the attack may be over. The narrow, two-lane roads were almost impassable
because crowds of people, many of them apparently on their way to church,
had stopped their cars to watch the inferno of death and destruction spread
panoramically before their eyes. These people were just staring skyward,
searching expectantly for some sign that the American forces were retaliating
and, at the same time, fearing another wave of enemy planes. The cars had
been parked all over the place, with no regard for other vehicles that might
have to pass by. This really slowed our response to Hickam—but perhaps that
saved some of our lives in the long run."
When Engine 6 reached the main gate to Hickam Field on Kamehameha
Highway, the bombing, strafing and anti-aircraft fire had ceased but there
were no further doubts in the firefighters' minds that the United States had
been attacked. The first wave of Japanese planes had struck Hickam and every
bomb and machine gun bullet seemed to have found its target. Many military
men had been fatally wounded before they even had a chance to strike back.
Dead, dying and wounded bodies lay everywhere. A multi-story 4000-man
concrete barracks on the right side of the main street was bombed and burning
fiercely. The underground gas main at the base's entrance had been hit and was
spewing flame dozens of feet into the air. Across the road, aircraft hangars and
a quarter-mile long row of planes parked outside the hangars were also in
flames. Ironically, the planes had been positioned like that to minimize the
dangers of sabotage. Among the 70 bombers parked there were 12 of the new
Flying Fortresses. Few were airworthy by the time Engine 6 arrived.3
Engine 6 was to report to the Hickam fire station upon arrival but they
discovered that the military station had also been bombed. One engine had
been driven about 20 feet out onto the ramp, apparently trying to respond,
before it was strafed by the low-flying Japanese planes. The driver was
slumped over the steering wheel, dead. The other engine never got out of the
station.4 Thus, the 12 men of HFD Engines 4 and 6 suddenly found that they
were the entire firefighting force available to handle the rescue, body recovery
and firefighting tasks. In the absence of any properly authorized military
officers, Lt. Kealoha as commanding officer of the HFD's first-due engine
company assumed authority and responsibility for the operations. Engine 1
from Honolulu's central station on S. Beretania Street downtown arrived
shortly afterward with six more men.
Hickam Field's primary water main also had fallen victim to a bomb blast
and the enormous crater was filling with water rapidly. No hydrants were
functional. Lt. Kealoha recounts that "I had just decided to try drafting from
the bomb crater when more Japanese planes appeared overhead, coming
directly from the south by way of Diamond Head and Waikiki Beach. I
screamed at my firefighters to take cover and they scattered in all directions.
Young and Tarn fled toward the burning hangars a couple of hundred feet
Destroyed American bombers at Hickam Field, adjacent to Pearl Harbor, after the Japanese




away; Pang and I went the opposite way, toward the barracks. Others tried
to hide beneath the wagons and pumpers. "Young added, "For the next 15
minutes, hell rained down from the skies in the form of whistling bombs and
screaming machine gun bullets, seemingly strafing everyone and everything
in sight. That quarter hour seemed like an eternity to us as we tried to make
ourselves invisible to the Japanese pilots and machine gunners. Finally, the
onslaught of shrapnel and bullets dwindled and stopped. The second wave of
the attack was over. The question in everyone's mind was 'How many more
will there be?' No one dared to even guess about that."
The firefighters hesitantly emerged from their hiding places and began to
assess the latest round of death and destruction. Three HFD members lay
dead: Captain Thomas Macy of Engine 4; Capt. John Carreira, Engine 1; and
Hoseman Harry Tuck Lee Pang, Engine 6. Lt. Kealoha and Hoseman Moses
Kaliikane were critically wounded and three others were less seriously hurt.
The remaining HFD members did little firefighting for a while, concentrating
instead on aiding the injured firefighters and military personnel.
Their apparatus—all manufactured by the Seagrave Corporation and much
of it 10 years old and chain-driven—had been repeatedly strafed and hit by
bomb fragments. The chemical tank of Engine I'S wagon was pierced by
shrapnel and Engine 6's pumper had too many bullet holes to count. Wagon 6
was afire. The pumpers of Engines 1 and 4 had been severely damaged by a
hail of shrapnel. All six tires were punctured on Engine i's pumper. Radiators
of several units were spewing miniature geysers of water through bullet holes.5
It was now about 0915. While the firefighters aided the injured men and got
a few token hose streams on the flames, the third attack wave descended upon
Hickam Field.6 Once more the firemen dashed for cover with machine gun
bullets literally striking at their heels. Fortunately, this attack was shorter than
the earlier ones.
Civilian volunteers and uninjured military personnel had organized by this
time and were tending to the wounded and dead. The injured Kealoha described
his experiences: "I was thrown into an Army truck and taken to the hospital at
Fort Shafter. I was kept outside on the grass all night. My wet clothes dried
right on me." He was ultimately to spend two months in the hospital and
another month recuperating at home before returning to duty.
The other HFD members returned to firefighting. They got their damaged
apparatus functioning by using brown soap and toilet paper to plug the holes
in the radiators. No one remembers exactly where these supplies came from;
seemingly they just materialized, most logically from the toilets in the burning
barracks.7 (Similarly, no one can account for some coins later found in the
driver's seat of Engine 4—not one of the firefighters remembers carrying any
money that day!)8 Then the men began attacking the fires, particularly those
Honolulu firefighters attack fire at Lunalilo School, caused by a defective anti-aircraft shell
falling back to earth during the Japanese attack. Hawaii War Records Depository,
University of Hawaii.
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threatening to involve additional airplanes and hangars. Three pumpers
dropped their hard suction hoses into the bomb crater that by now was filled
with water from the ruptured main. Sixty-four hundred feet of 2 1/2-inch line
was laid by hand—a monumental feat in itself! Two-and-a-half-inch lines
wyed down to inch-and-a-half ones became the sole method of attack. No
master stream appliances of any type, portable or fixed, could be used because
of the limited water supply. The firefighters had no mobility in their operations
because there was only the one water source. This difficulty was compounded
by the punctured radiators and flattened tires, of course.
Fires of the magnitude of those burning at Hickam that day would normally
have been attacked with very large nozzles, discharging as much as 1500 to
2000 gallons of water per minute (gpm), supplied by multiple 2 1/2-inch
hoselines, each capable of discharging about 250 gpm. Limited water supply
obviated the use of this first-line-of-defense weaponry, however. The 1 1/2-inch
lines they used discharged between 60 and 90 gpm.
Hickam's water system was restored during the afternoon so the companies
regained some maneuverability, within the limits of their hastily and tempora-
rily repaired apparatus, and the fires were quelled without further incident
after another 14 hours. The last HFD company returned to Honolulu at about
midnight Sunday. They had fought aircraft and hangar fires, barracks and
fuel storage tank blazes, and burning ammunition storage buildings. A lifetime
of firefighting experience had been crammed into that single day.
The men of Engines 1, 4 and 6 had more fire than they could handle at
Hickam Field. Any one of the burning barracks would ordinarily have drawn
a three-alarm assignment. Since the firemen knew for certain that Pearl
Harbor had been attacked, and probably other bases as well, these structural
fires were ignored while the airplanes—the symbol and instrument of retalia-
tion—were burning. As they labored at Hickam, they could see the ominous
towering smoke columns at the adjacent Navy base. Actually, the planes with
the Rising Sun emblem had struck with even greater force at Pearl Harbor.
Although the Navy was party to the mutual aid pact with the City, no HFD
units were dispatched to Pearl Harbor—there simply were none available. All
firefighting and rescue work done at Pearl Harbor was carried out by Navy
and Coast Guard personnel and by civilian volunteers. Many of the latter
were second and third generation, U.S.-born American citizens of Japanese
ancestry. The carnage and destruction from this attack on Pearl Harbor are
well known and little repetition is needed here—18 ships sunk or seriously
damaged, 188 aircraft destroyed and 159 damaged, 2403 people killed and
1178 wounded.9
The HFD responded to 39 alarms on that fateful Sunday, although not all
of the fires were caused by enemy action.10 The HFD's resources were being
strained severely so the five two-piece companies still in quarters were split.
Only one unit was initially dispatched on each alarm for the next three days.
Members of Honolulu Fire Department's Engine 5 attack fire at Lunalilo School during




All off-duty members had been called back to work by commercial radio
broadcasts by 0830 and most of the 161 officers and men were on the job two
hours later. Nine commercial trucks were also commandeered, loaded with
2^-inch hose and placed in strategic locations around Honolulu. Each was
commanded by a trained firefighter and manned by civilian volunteers. Thus,
five pumpers and five hosewagons with professional crews, and nine wagons
with largely untrained crews, were left to protect Honolulu.11
The bombs had barely stopped falling when the HFD alarm bureau became
deluged with calls for assistance ranging from reports of live electrical wires
down to bomb strikes to serious building fires. Lopez said that "There were
so many fire alarm boxes being pulled that one round was coming in on top
of another." Thus, HFD Chief W. W. (Bill) Blaisdell ordered his alarm bureau
dispatchers to ignore all box alarms and respond apparatus only to addresses
given by telephone callers—a critical strategic decision since it could conceivably
mean that no apparatus would respond to a citizen's urgent plea for help.
However, so many false alarms were being pulled, presumably from sheer
terror and panic, that it would have been impossible to dispatch even one
company to each alarm. Thus, Blaisdell based his decision on the probability
that should an emergency incident actually be occurring, the box alarm would
likely be supplemented by telephone calls.
The first call was logged in the official HFD records at 083312—a shell had
hit a two-story wooden residence at 2683 Pacific Heights Road. And then the
avalanche of alarms started :
0844 Lewers and Cooke Department Store downtown struck by a shell;
0925 Depot Road, Waipahu—enemy plane crash;
0926 1630 Leilehua Lane—shell exploded in a wooden cottage.
And so it went throughout the morning. Reports of explosions and injured
persons were coming in to the HFD alarm bureau from all over Honolulu. One
occurred on the grounds of Iolani Palace; another killed a man at Washington
Place. Four civilian employees at Pearl Harbor died when their car was hit
on Judd Street—they had been trying to get to work. A woman died from
shrapnel wounds in upper Nuuanu Valley, eight miles from the military
targets. Several amateur boxers were wounded or killed while eating at a
saimin stand at Nuuanu and Kukui Streets. The toll of civilian casualties rose
rapidly, most of the people being victims of bizarre accidents as they sought
to protect their families and property. Some of the survivors have very
frightening stories to relate about their harrowing experiences. One person
tells about shrapnel shearing off a telephone pole six inches above his head;13
another of walls falling where she had stood seconds before.14 A third speaks
Thirteen buildings were destroyed by a fire at King and McCully Streets in Honolulu,
probably caused by an enemy bomb. Members of Honolulu's Engine 5 and civilian bystanders
fight the flames, assisted by Wagon 7 from Waikiki. Hawaii War Records Depository,
University of Hawaii.
of shrapnel breaking a window in front of her just as she stumbled over a curb
and fell headlong to the ground.15
Alexander Beck, an off-duty hoseman at Engine 4, reported to his station
and found that his company had already gone to Hickam. He and two volunteers
put a reserve pumper into service. Beck said, "I realized right away that I was
both officer and apparatus driver. Almost immediately (at 1050) we were
dispatched to the Honolulu Gas Company in Iwilei for a gas storage tank fire.
One of their two huge tanks was burning. Engine 2 was already there and I told
my volunteers to give me a hand with the hose. I really wondered how we were
ever going to get that fire out. A bomb or maybe an unexploded anti-aircraft
shell had blasted a hole in the top of the tank. Gas was shooting up through
this hole and was burning spectacularly. Employees from the Gas Company
and my volunteers helped the firemen carry sandbags to the top of the tank.
We built a dike around the hole and then filled it with water and foam to
extinguish the fire. It took about two hours and, by then, a third of the gas
had escaped and burned."
Three major structural fires occurred almost simultaneously near the
intersection of King and McCully Streets, a light commercial and residential
district about eight miles from the military bases. One caused heavy damage
and death at Lunalilo School and another burned three houses at Hauoli and
Algaroba Streets. The most serious of the three burned a block of stores and
residences occupied by 31 people.16
The experiences of the men of Engine Company 5, and of Ernest Cockett
in particular, typify those of the five HFD engine companies that did not
respond directly to the military base at Hickam.
Cockett, strangely enough, was glad to be working at the King-McCully
fires rather than with his company of two days previously. Cockett recalled his
experiences as Engine 5's engineer (apparatus driver): "I had been with the
HFD since 1935 and had finally gotten a promotion. Now I was an engineer
and had just reported for my second day of work at Engine Company 5 on the
mauka side of Diamond Head in Kaimuki. Previously, I had been assigned to
Engine 4 in Palama. You know, I almost turned down that promotion! It
meant a terribly long trip from my home in Kalihi. I came that close to being
in the middle of the attack on Hickam with Engine 4."
Like virtually overyone else in Honolulu, Cockett and the other men of
Engine 5 were watching those ominous black smoke puffs over leeward Oahu,
also realizing that they were from live ammunition; their worst fears of an
enemy attack were confirmed by commercial radio broadcasts. Engine 5 was
HFD's most distant company from Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, but this
company was quickly transferred to Engine 3's quarters in Makiki and then
to Engine 1 's downtown. From there they responded to numerous calls, includ-
ing a working fire* at Liliha and Judd Streets. Soon reporting themselves
* A "working fire" is a descriptive termfor any fire that, in the estimation of the first-arriving
chief officer, firefighters already present are unlikely to be able to control and extinguish.
It is an alert to the alarm bureau dispatcher that additional companies may be needed.
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available, Hosewagon 5 was next dispatched by telephone to the King-McCully
fire near their own quarters. After a five-mile run back across Honolulu, they
arrived to find a row of buildings heavily involved. A shell had detonated in
a corner drug store, injuring a woman and setting the store aflame. Hosewagon
7 from Waikiki was already operating on McCully Street and just about had
the fire contained, so Wagon 5 worked to halt the advancing flames at the other
end of this block. Portable and deck-mounted deluge sets* and 2^-inch
handlines were manned by firefighters and civilian bystanders. There were no
pumpers at the scene so hydrant pressure had to suffice. Although it was
reasonably adequate, 13 buildings were leveled before control was estab-
lished. One of the houses burned belonged to a fireman who was with his
company at Hickam Field.
A second major fire broke out at about the same time at Hauoli and Algaroba
Streets, a block from the King-McCully intersection. Wagon 5 quickly picked
up and responded but several houses were already totally involved.
While Hosewagons 5 and 7 were committed at these two fires, several people
raced up to the exhausted firefighters, shouting that Lunalilo School on
Pumehana Street three blocks away had been bombed as it was being filled
with civilian evacuees and was now ablaze. The school was a large two-story,
woodframe building built in a U-shape. Subsequent investigation proved that
the "bomb" was actually a defective American anti-aircraft shell that exploded
upon impact when it fell back to earth. Three civilians died and 15 were hurt
in the explosion. Cockett recalled that "People were yelling for us to respond
to the school but there was no way we could do that right away. We had every
length of hose laid out and charged. We had our fire just about out, though,
so we did pick up as quick as we could, leaving two men at the Hauoli Street
fireground." By that time, though, Lunalilo School was heavily involved on
the second floor and roof at the bottom of the "U". Wagon 5*s short-handed
and exhausted crew moved in with four i\ inch handlines and managed to hold
the flames at that point, once again relying solely upon hydrant pressure.
It is interesting to note that Honolulu's fire losses for December 7, 1941,
accounted for sixty percent of the loss for that entire year.17 This does not
include the military losses which were tallied separately.
All HFD members were on continuous duty until the morning of Tuesday,
December 9th, when each man was given four hours off. From Thursday,
December n th , through Sunday the 14th, the two shifts alternated working
eight-hour stints. The regular 24-hour tours of duty followed by 24 hours off
were resumed on Monday, December 15th.18 However, there was a standing
order for all off-duty firefighters to report to work whenever the air raid
sirens sounded.
* Hose streams are categorized as either handlines (which are usually held by 3 or 4 men)
or master stream appliances. The latter may be removed from the engine and strategically
located at the fire, or they may be permanently mounted on the engine (deck-mounted).
Deluge sets are one type of master stream appliance. Handlines flow from 15 to 250
gallons of water per minute (gpm) ; master stream appliances, 500 to 2000 or more gpm.
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Hawaii's Governor Joseph B. Poindexter issued a proclamation of martial
law at 1630 hours (4:30 p.m.) Sunday afternoon, just 30 minutes after Emporer
Hirohito formally declared war on the United States and Great Britain.
Poindexter authorized and requested Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department of the U. S. Army, to "exercise all
powers normally exercised by me as Governor". The HFD was also placed
under the command of Military Governor Short and his successor, Lt. Gen.
Delos C. Emmons, for the duration of the war.19
Lopez remembers finding two territorial guardsmen assigned to their
firehouse when they returned to the Waikiki station around dusk that Sunday.
"One was stationed in front, the other in back. Each fire captain was issued
a .45-caliber revolver and ordered to shoot any saboteur or anyone else who
interfered with firefighting operations. We heard a rumor that Japanese planes
were parachuting troops into the Koolau mountains and that the Japanese
fleet was right outside Pearl Harbor. Meanwhile our two guards had opened
fire on a car that failed to heed their order to stop. The driver turned into the
firehouse and screamed that some fools were shooting at him. Later, the two
guards surprised each other while patrolling outside the station and fired
several rounds at each other before realizing their mistake. That is one day
that I'll never forget!"
Throughout the war years, the HFD joined with the Army and Navy in an
exhibition of unity, courage and calm self-control that will stand forever as a
tribute to the Honolulu Fire Department. This was epitomized on that
unforgettable December morning in 1941. Six Honolulu firefighters were later
awarded Purple Hearts,20 a commendation usually reserved for service
personnel wounded in combat. Three of these were awarded posthumously.
The HFD had earned the distinction of being the only civilian fire department
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